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A Special Needs Exception to the Warrant and
Probable Cause Requirements for Mandatory and
Uniform Pre-Arraignment Drug Testing in the
Wake of Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association and National Treasury Employees'
Union v. Von Raab
I.

INTRODUCTION

Until 1989, the Supreme Court had not addressed Fourth
Amendment limitations on the use of mandatory, suspicionless
urine testing by the federal government aimed at detecting
drug use. Recently, however, in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association 1 and National Treasury Employees'
Union v. Von Raab, 2 the Court upheld federal regulations
which broadly expanded the circumstances and conditions under which urine testing could occur in the public sector and the
government regulated workplace. 3
Until recently, the systematic testing of arrestees for drug
use was uncommon. However, due to the epidemic of drug
use, 4 and the rapid advances made in testing technology, 5 sev

1.
2.
3.

489 U.S. 602 (1989).
489 u.s. 656 (1989).
For recent articles written on Skinner and Von Raab see Michael A. Mass,

Public Sector Drug Testing: A Balancing Approach and the Search for a New Equilibrium, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 231 (1990); George E. Warner, Jr., Note, The Ratification of the "Special Needs" Analysis to Employer Substance Abuse Testing:
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 13 HAMLINE L.
REV. 167 (1989); Alyssa C. Westover, Note, National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab--Will the War Against Drugs Abrogate Constitutional Guarantees?, 17
PEPP. L. REV. 793 (1990). For articles focusing on drug testing in the criminal
justice system see Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Fourth Amendment Implications of Urine
Testing for Evidence of Drug Abuse in Probation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1159 (1990);
Cathryn Jo Rosen & John S. Goldkamp, The Constitutionality of Drug Testing at
the Bail Stage, 80 J. CRIM. 1. & CRIMINOLOGY 114 (1989); Richard B. Abell, Pretrial Drug Testing: Expanding Rights and Protecting Public Safety, 57 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 943 (1989).
4.
Recently, the Bush Administration's "Drug Czar" observed some success in
the "War on Drugs" by noting that from 1985 to 1990 the estimated number of
illicit drug users dropped from 23 million to 13 million. Governor Bob Martinez,
Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Address at the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference Convention in Birmingham, AL, Federal News
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eral jurisdictions now routinely request arrestees to submit to
pre-arraignment drug tests. Fueling this trend has been research showing a positive correlation between drug use by
arrestees and their propensity to either fail to appear for court
hearings or commit additional criminal acts while released
pending trial. 6 Moreover, President Bush's call for increased
drug testing at every stage of the criminal justice
process-including pretrial testing-signals the political momentum behind the drug testing push. 7
This comment examines Fourth Amendment limitations on
the current practice in the District of Columbia of mandatory
drug testing of all adult arrestees for the purpose of gathering
bail related information before each arrestee makes an initial
appearance before a bail-setting judge. Part II briefly describes
the background to the establishment of pre-arraignment drug
testing in the District of Columbia and in other jurisdictions.
Part III reviews the current practice of pre-arraignment drug
testing programs based on the District of Columbia model. Part
IV introduces the facts and analyses of Skinner and Von Raab.
Part V applies the Skinner and Von Raab rationale to the District of Columbia drug testing program. Finally, this comment
concludes that careful and structured use of pre-arraignment
drug testing will fit well within the Fourth Amendment drug
testing parameters established by the Supreme Court in Skinner and Von Raab.

Service, August 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal News Service
File. He cautioned, however, that addicts pose the greatest threat to society and
their numbers have not significantly decreased. ld.
5.
See Rosen, supra note 3, at 1162 n.9 and accompanying text.
6.
See generally JOHN A. CARVER, U.S. DEp'T OF JUSTICE, DRUGS AND CRIME:
CONTROLLING USE AND REDUCING RISK THROUGH TESTING (SepJOct. 1986); BERNARD A. GROPPER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBING THE LINKS BETWEEN DRUGS
AND CRIME (Feb. 1985); Douglas A. Smith et a!., Drug Use and Pretrial Misconduct
in New York City 5 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 101, 102 (1989); MARY A.
TOBERG & MICHAEL P. KIRBY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG USE AND PRETRIAL
CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Oct. 1984); Christy A. Visher, Using Drug

Testing to Identify High-Risk Defendants on Release: A Study in the District of Columbia 18 J. CRIM. JUST. 321 (1990); ERIC D. WISH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG
USE FORECASTING: NEW YORK 1984 TO 1986 (Feb. 1987); ANTHONY M.J. YEZER ET
AL., U.S. DEp'T OF JUSTICE, Doc. No. 107,746, PERIODIC URINE TESTING AS A
SIGNALING DEVICE FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE RISK 24 (May 1988).
National Drug Control Strategy, 25 WEEKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1308, 1309
7.
(Sept. 5, 1989). Also, the United States allocated nearly ten billion dollars in 1990
alone towards battling the drug problem. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL STRATEGY 7 (Jan. 1990).
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BACKGROUND

Typically, an arrest is made before anyone ever faces a
criminal prosecution. Once within the criminal justice system
the arrestee experiences a certain degree of tension between
his or her liberty interests and at least two institutional requirements of many court systems in the United States: (1) securing the return of the arrestee for trial; and (2) insuring that
the arrestee's behavior on release does not pose a threat to the
community. Occasionally, these governmental interests are
adequately served only by pretrial detention. 8 In United States
v. Salerno, 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist cautioned that: "In our
society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception." 10 Accordingly,
arrestees are free of guilt until a conviction is secured, but
there is not an absolute right to bailY
Conditions and procedures for setting bail are established
by federal and state statutes. Traditionally, arrestee flight
before trial was the principal concern in judicial pre-trial release determinations. During the late-1960's, however, communities became increasingly anxious over risks posed by accused
criminals who committed further crimes while released on
bail. 12 Consequently, at least thirty-two states, the District of
Columbia, and the federal government passed laws establishing
public safety as an additional factor to be considered by a judge
when setting bail or establishing other pretrial release conditions. 13 In Salerno, the Supreme Court validated the behavioral factor by holding that the prevention of public danger to the
community can outweigh an arrestee's interest in liberty. 14
In attempting to predict either type of pretrial misconduct,

8.
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 523, 523 (1979).
9.
481 U.S. 739 (1987).
10.
ld. at 755.
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754-55 (1987) (holding that the
11.
eighth amendment grants no absolute right to bail); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
524, 541-42, 544-46 (1952) (holding that when aliens are dangerous, their detention
pending a deportation hearing does not violate the eighth amendment); Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (holding that bail is a conditional right).
12.
BARBARA GoTTLIEB, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PuBLIC DANGER AS A FACTOR IN
PRETRIAL RELEASE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE LAWS 1, 17-20 (July 1985);
see also John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail
Reform, 76 J. CRJM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 56-64 (1985).
See GoTTLIEB, supra note 12, at 17-20.
13.
14.
481 U.S. at 748.
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judges must somehow fill the information vacuum relating to
each arrestee in order to establish pretrial release conditions.
Typically, judges assess the risks posed by arrestees while on
pretrial release by weighing a variety of factors, such as, the
nature of the charge, the arrestees employment status, family
and community ties, or past criminal activities. However, predictions based upon these criteria are largely subjective and
could lead to inconsistent results. 15 The D.C. bail statute, similar to the statutes of many other jurisdictions, allows judges to
base pretrial release on financial or nonfinancial conditions.
Nonfinancial conditions include release by restricting travel,
association, place of abode, or by requiring the arrestee to
maintain employment, to stay off drugs, or to abide by "any
other condition". 16
Quite often judges have incomplete and unconfirmed information about arrestees when they are arraigned. In attempting
to substantiate information, most major cities now have neutral
fact-finders, or pretrial services agencies, which assist the
judge in making pretrial release decisions. The D.C. Pretrial
Services Agency performs typical pretrial information gathering
by: (1) interviewing all arrestees to gather factual matter relevant to pretrial release; (2) taking the gathered data and submitting release recommendations to the court; and (3) monitoring compliance with whatever conditions are actually imposed
by the court. 17
For several years, the Department of Justice has actively
promoted greater use of pre-arraignment drug testing as a
means of gathering release relevant information. In order to
determine the viability of the concept, the Justice Department
funded a pilot program in Washington, D.C. in 1984. After the
program's successful implementation, it was implemented in
the federal pretrial system. The department funded similar
programs in three additional jurisdictions in late 1987 18 and
added another three in 1988. 19 Currently, federal funds are

15.
See James K. Stewart, Quid Pro Quo: Stay Drug-Free and Stay on Release,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 73 (1988).
See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1981).
16.
MARY A. TOBERG ET AL, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ASSESSMENT OF PRETRIAL
17.
URINE TESTING IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA vi (Dec. 1989).
The new sites were Portland, Oregon; Tucson, Arizona; and Wilmington
18.
County, Delaware.
19.
These additional sites were Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Phoenix, Arizona; and
Prince Georges County, Maryland. The last six programs established were funded
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used in the operation of five arrestee drug testing programs. 20
The federal government has substantiated the relevance of
drug testing to release decision making by exploring the drugcrime connection through various studies. For example, the
Department of Justice has screened thousands of anonymous
arrestees for illegal drug use through its Drug Use Forecasting
program. 21 Alarmingly, the research shows that in every participating city the majority of all arrestees use drugs. In some
cities well over three-quarters of all arrestees test positive for
drugs. 22 More recently, a survey of jail inmates conducted by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics reveals a clear connection between the use of illegal drugs and the incidence of theft and
violent crime. 23 The study found that one in three convicted
robbers and burglars admitted that the need to buy drugs was
a motive behind their crime, one in four violent offenders and
one-third of those convicted of property crimes were on drugs
when committing their crimes, four in ten convicts had used
drugs during the month before their offense, and nearly onethird of offenders had been using illegal drugs every day during
the month before their crime. 24
Ill.

THE CURRENT USE OF PRETRIAL DRUG TESTING

Although some differences exist, the operation of the test-

pursuant to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4309
(1988).
20.
All of the drug testing programs established through the Justice Department funding are still in operation, with the exception of the Wilmington, Delaware program. The Washington, D.C. program is now operated with local funding.
For specific details on the status of these programs see Cynthia Durrant Jensen,
Comment, Survey of Current and Prior Pretrial Drug Testing Sites, 5 B.Y.U. J.
PUB. L. ??? (1991).
21.
The Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program tested 300 to 400 arrestees detained in jails in 21 cities for drug use four times a year to detect the level of
drug use in the criminal population. In contrast to the pre-arraignment testing, the
tests are done anonymously, with no results being reported to the court. See NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPI'. OF JUSTICE, DRUG USE FORECASTING PROGRAM: FIRST QUARTER, 1989 (1989).
22.
Id. The percentage of male arrestees testing positive for drugs was over
75% for 8 of the 12 cities. Chicago and San Diego lead the nation with arrestee
use rates over 80%. Id. Every city in the survey, but Phoenix, showed drug use
rates of over 60%. Id.
23.
Inmate Study Links Crime, Drug Habits, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1991, at A13.
The findings were based on 5,675 questionnaires returned by inmates of local jails.
Jail Inmate Survey Links Drugs and Crime, U.S. Newswire, Aug. 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, U.S. Newswire File [hereinafter Survey].
24.
Survey, supra note 2a.
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ing programs are generally modeled after the D.C. testing program. This program has two principal goals. The first is to
provide bail-setting judges with a less subjective method to
determine recent drug use by defendants. The second is to
provide the court with a simple and effective new release condition that can reduce both the risk of failure to appear and pretrial criminal activity. 25
The drug testing process begins soon after the arrestees
are brought to the courthouse lock-up. While awaiting a pretrial release hearing, every arrestee is informed about the drug
testing procedure and for what purpose the results will be
used. Then the arrestee is asked by a pretrial services worker
to voluntarily submit a urine sample for drug testing. 26 If the
arrestee refuses to submit a sample, that refusal is recorded
and reported to the bail-setting judge who usually will order
the defendant to take a urine test as a basis of any nonfinancial release.
In order to ensure the integrity of the sample, 27 the arrestee urinates in full view of a pretrial services worker and
often in the incidental view of four or five other inmates awaiting their turn. The urine is hand-delivered to a lab housed in
the building and immediately tested for the presence of various
specific illicit drugs. 28 Urine samples are screened using the

25.
TOBERG, supra note 17, at 1.
26.
The pretrial services worker is required to give the following warning before
collecting any sample:
My name is _ _ and I work for the Pretrial Services Agency. I am
here to collect a urine sample from you. That sample will be tested and
the results will be ready for court. The results will be used only to make
a release recommendation and cannot be used against you in your case.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCY, PRETRIAL SERVICES TRAINING
MANUAL 125 (1989) [hereinafter MANUAL).
27.
John A. Carver, Esq., Director of the D.C. pretrial services, observed that
nearly every day a defendant attempts to tamper with the procedures through such
devices as attaching some apparatus to the body, using a proxy, or through bribery. United States v. Centurino, No. 87-0043-14-LFO, 1987 WL 12486, at *2, *3
(D.D.C. May 21, 1987) (letter appended to the order of the district court). In order
to establish chain of custody, the pretrial services worker verifies the name of the
arrestee by checking the defendants wristband, gives the defendant a cup to fill,
then when the sample is returned, the worker verifies the testee's identity by
checking the wristband. Next, the arrestee inspects the label for correctness, after
which he or she attaches it to the sample. The worker then checks off the
arrestee's name on the lock-up list. During this process a worker maintains a clear
view of the cellblock urinal although the established procedures do not require
actual observation of the genital area. See generally id. at 125.
28.
The arrestees' urine is tested for the presence of opiates, cocaine, PCP,
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enzyme-multiplied immunoassay test (EMIT). 29 Samples that
test drug-positive are retested. The test results are reported to
the judge at or before the arraignment of the arrestee. To keep
the test results out of the public record, the result is verbally
reported to the judge by the pretrial services representative in
the courtroom. Test results are required by law to be used
solely for setting conditions of release and are kept confidential
by the court. 30
Generally, arrestees testing positive for drug use are required, as a condition of release, to report to the pretrial services agency for subsequent drug testing or to a drug treatment
program. Failure to report for urinalysis or to abstain from
drug use is grounds for temporary or permanent revocation of
pretrial release under the contempt power of the court. 31
Results of the testing program in Washington, D.C. show
that it is accomplishing its goals. The experience of the District
of Columbia shows that urine testing leads to greater predictability of pretrial misconduct by making a "consistent, significant, incremental contribution to pretrial risk classification"
above that achieved through weighing traditional factors, such
as, community ties, past criminal record, and the like. 32 Drug
testing also provides an alternative release mechanism for
those who might otherwise remain in jail because they are
unable to raise funds for bail. 33
Judges in the District of Columbia are responding favorably to the information gained through pre-arraignment drug
testing. The vast majority of judges place significant reliance
on the drug test information as one of the factors used in mak-

amphetamines, and methadone.
29.
The Syva Company, maker of the enzyme-multiplied immunoassay test
(EMIT), claims that the test is 95% accurate while others argue the EMIT's
reliability may be as low as 82%. Rosen, supra note 3, at 1167 n.26 and accompanying text.
30.
The PSA enabling legislation requires that "[a]ny information contained in
the agency's files, presented in its report, or divulged during the course of the
hearing shall not be admissible on the issue of guilt in any judicial proceeding."
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1303(d) (1981). The PSA interprets this provision as proscribing them from using pretrial urine tests on the issue of guilt or innocence in any
subsequent proceeding. TOBEHG, supra note 17, at 2. Release of test information is
strictly regulated and under no condition is the confidential information released to
families of defendants, victims, third party custodians, the media, or the police. ld.;
see generally MANUAL, supra note 26, at 129-30.
31.
TOBERG, supra note 17, at 1-2.
32.
TOBERG, supra note 17, at 10-11.
33.
Abell, supra note 3, at 956.
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ing release decisions. 34 In addition, judges tend to feel more
comfortable releasing drug-related offenders before trial. 35
Moreover, a majority of judges surveyed in the District of Columbia felt that the pretrial drug testing program is responsible for a reduction in pretrial criminality and failures to appear.36
IV.
AND

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n
National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab

Although the courts have rendered many decisions concerning drug testing under varied circumstances, only in Berry v.
District of Columbia, 37 has any significant constitutional challenge to the pretrial drug testing procedure been presented
before a federal circuit court of appeals. The Berry court, however, never decided the constitutional issues raised by pretrial
drug testing but remanded those issues back to the district
court where the case was eventually dismissed for failure to
prosecute. 38 However, the Supreme Court in Skinner and Von
Raab has established the analysis by which Fourth Amendment challenges to government drug testing programs are
assessed.

A. The Skinner Facts
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,39
railway labor unions brought suit in federal district court to
enjoin the enforcement of regulations promulgated by the Fed-

34.
Mary A. Toberg & John P. Bellassai, Pretrial Urine-Testing in the District
of Columbia: The Perspectives of Judicial Officers, 22-23 (August 1989) (draft, on
file with author) [hereinafter Judicial Perspectives].
35.
Visher, supra note 6, at 19.
36.
Judicial Perspectives, supra note 34, at 19.
37.
833 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
38.
107 F.R.D. 663 (D.D.C. 1987); see also Abney V. District of Columbia, Civ.
No. 87-2339 SSH, 1989 WL 17750 (D.D.C. 1989) (dismissing case challenging prearraignment drug testing, in part, because some parties and issues overlapped the
Berry case). The court of appeals held that the compulsory urinalysis involved in
post-release testing program was a Fourth Amendment search, requiring a showing
of reasonableness in order to pass constitutional muster. Berry, 833 F.2d at 103436. Finding the record barren of factual findings relating to the testing program
and its operation, the court of appeals remanded the case back to the district court
to make such factual findings. !d. Since the defendant did not submit a urine
sample before his arraignment, the court refused to consider the issue of the
constitutionality of the pre-arraignment testing portion of the program. !d.
39.
489 u.s. 602 (1989).

409]

SPECIAL NEEDS EXCEPTION

417

eral Railroad Administration (FRA) aimed at determining the
involvement of drugs or alcohol in specific types of train accidents.40 Under the regulations, the immediate chemical testing of blood and urine specimens for the presence of alcohol
and illicit drugs is mandated for all railroad employees involved in a serious train accident. 41 In addition, the regulations authorize testing of any employee who a supervisor reasonably suspects is under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 42
The railroad transports each employee to be tested to an independent medical facility where each gives both a blood and
urine sample. 43 The employees are required to fill out a form
disclosing any medications they may have taken in the past
thirty days. This information is used to help explain any falsepositive test results. 44 Each employee is indirectly monitored
as the urine sample is given, although direct observation is a
more effective means of ensuring sample integrity. 45 The samples are then sent to an FRA laboratory for analysis. Samples
testing positive are then confirmed through retesting. 46 Employees refusing to take the test cannot work at their present
positions for nine months though they are entitled to a hearing
related to that refusal. 47 The FRA regulations require that
employees are notified of test results and allowed an opportunity to make a written response to those findings. 48 While the
drug test information is not sought for prosecutorial purposes,
the FRA regulations do not forbid the use of test results as
evidence in any criminal prosecution. 49
The district court granted summary judgment for the railroad and refused to enjoin the FRA from enforcing the new
regulations. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court judgement. 5° While the circuit court
40.
49 C.F.R. §§ 219.101 to 219.307 (1989).
49 C.F.R. § 219.201 (1989).
41.
42.
49 C.F.R. § 219.301 (1989).
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609.
43.
ld. at 610.
44.
45.
ld.
46.
ld. at 609-10.
47.
ld. at 610-11.
48.
ld. at 610.
49.
ld. at 621 n.5. The Supreme Court approved of the testing program in
Skinner, even though 49 C.F.R. § 219.21l(d) (1987) provided that the test results
could be used in criminal prosecution. The Court opined that the testing program
was intended for an administrative purpose and, consequently, was not intended as
a "pretext" to aid in criminal prosecutions. ld.
50.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988),
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waived the warrant and probable cause requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, it concluded that the tests were unreasonable because requiring a particularized suspicion did not impose an overly burdensome duty on the railroad. 51 The Supreme Court reversed. 52

B.

The Von Raab Facts

In 1985, The Customs Service, while not believing it had a
drug problem within its ranks, instituted a mass drug testing
program among employees seeking certain categories of employment. 53 Testing is mandatory for all applicants seeking
positions having direct involvement in the "drug war", requiring the employee to carry a firearm, or involving access to classified material desirable to drug smugglers. 54
Under the program employees are given five-days notice of
their testing date. 55 All arrangements for the drug test are
made through an independent contractor. 56 To ensure integrity of the sample, the test procedures include: requiring photo
identification, removal of outer garments and personal belongings, placing dye in the toilet water, checking the sample for
proper color and temperature, and placing the urine sample in
a tamper proof container and a sealed plastic bag before sending it to a laboratory. 5 7 While the presence of a same sex monitor is required, the employee may urinate behind a partition or
in a bathroom stall. 58 The current regulations do not require
the employee to disclose any personal medical information
unless the specimen test is drug-positive. 59 The samples are
tested initially with the EMIT technique and drug-positive
results are then confirmed using highly sophisticated gas
chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). 60 The test re-

rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
ld. at 588.
51.
52.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660 (1989).
53.
ld. at 660-61.
54.
Id. at 664.
55.
56.
ld. at 661.
57.
ld.
58.
ld.
59.
ld. at 661 n.l.
60.
ld. at 662. Gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) is slightly more
accurate than EMIT but can cost from $70 to $100 to perform while EMIT runs as
little as $5. Rosen, supra note 3, at 1162 n.9 and accompanying text, 1167-68 nn.
26-31 and accompanying text.
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suits are kept confidential by the Customs Service and may not
be used for criminal prosecution without the employee's written
consent. 61
The National Treasury Employees Union was granted an
injunction by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana halting the Customs Service's drug testing program
holding that it violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 62 On appeal, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction and held the program was constitutional. 63 The circuit
court found that the Customs Service's interest in deterring
drug use among its employees outweighed the limited intrusion
into their privacy. 64 The Supreme Court upheld the appellate
court's decision with regard to workers who were either directly
involved in the drug interdiction effort or who carried a firearm; but, the Court held that the record was too barren to
determine the reasonability of applying the program to workers
with access to classified materials. 65

C.

The Court's Analysis in Skinner and Von Raab

1.

Urinalysis Constitutes a Fourth Amendment Search

Prior to Skinner and Von Raab, the lower courts were inconsistent on a number of issues relating to drug testing. Confusion existed concerning such matters as the necessity of requiring particularized suspicion, 66 the strength of the required
nexus between the government objective and the means of
furthering that objective, 67 the relevance of least restrictive
alternatives, 68 the type of evidence required on which to base
conclusions that a drug problem exists, and the kind of proof
needed to support a connection between the problem and the
means of addressing it. 69 The Skinner and Von Raab Courts

61.
!d. at 663.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.
62.
La. 1986).
National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.
63.
1987).
!d. at 177-78.
64.
65.
National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677-78
(1989).
Carver, supra note 6, at 343-44; Westover, supra note 3, at 809 n.141.
66.
67.
Rosen, supra note 3,at 1231-32.
68.
Rosen, supra note 3, at 1232-33.
69.
Rosen. supra note 3, at 1234-36.
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cast light on how issues related to mandatory and suspicionless
drug testing must be resolved under the Fourth Amendment.
In accordance with lower court decisions, 70 the Supreme
Court held for the first time that urinalysis compelled by the
government constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.71 Traditionally, only those tests which necessitated an
actual physical intrusion, such as a blood test, were afforded
Fourth Amendment protection. 72 Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, quoted the Fifth Circuit:
"There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine. Most people describe it by
euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its
performance in public is generally prohibited by law as well
as social custom.'173

The Court held that a urinalysis is a search 74 under the
Fourth Amendment because it implicates expectations of privacy in both the act of urination and in the subsequent chemical
analysis of the urine specimen which could reveal highly personal information about the testee. 75

70.
On the circuit court level see Lovvorn v. City of Chatanooga, 846 F.2d
1539, 1542 (6th Cir. 1988); R.L.E.A. v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 580 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); N.F.F.E. v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated sub nom.
Jenkins v. Jones, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989); Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d
1031, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1986);
and Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976). At the district court level see Feliciano v.
City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 586 (N.D. Ohio 1987); American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Capua v. City of
Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986); and McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F.
Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
71.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17.
72.
See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (holding that
a blood test is a search because it intrudes into the skin and subsequent chemical
analysis reveals private information).
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v.
73.
Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987)).
74.
The Court noted that blood or urine testing could constitute a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment because of one's possessory interest in his or her
bodily fluids, Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 n.4 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 113 (1984)), but the Court determined that protections afforded expectations of privacy adequately protected any property interest in bodily fluids. Id.
75.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (explaining that chemical analysis can reveal personal conditions, such as, pregnancy, epilepsy, or diabetes).
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2. Drug Tests Are Reasonable Under the "Special Needs"
Analysis
a. The presence of "special needs". The Constitution
requires all searches to be reasonable. In Skinner and Von
Raab the court reemphasized that "reasonableness" generally
requires that searches be carried out pursuant to a warrant
based on probable cause. 76 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy
stated that it is a "longstanding principle that neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor ... any measure of individualized
suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in
every circumstance." 77 One such circumstance is where the
search furthers a "special need" of the government in a non-law
enforcement situation in which the warrant and probable cause
requirements are impractical. 78 In Skinner the government
had a special need in maintaining the safe operation of the railroads.79 Similarly, in Von Raab the Court held that the Customs Service had a special need in maintaining the integrity of
the borders and in ensuring public safety. 80
b. Drug tests reasonable absent a warrant. The Court
noted that an essential purpose behind the warrant requirement is to assure citizens that they are not being subjected to
arbitrary or random government acts. 81 A government search
under a warrant informs citizens that the search is lawful and
narrowly tailored in purpose and scope. 82 The Court found
that in both Skinner and Von Raab the purposes of a warrant
were otherwise served due to such factors as: only specific circumstances triggered the imposition of the drug tests; the intrusion was limited by specific and narrow definition in the
regulations; moreover, the regulations put employees on notice
as to the procedures; and only minimal discretion existed over imposing the drug tests on employees. 83
Heightening the need to dispense with the warrant requirement was the Court's finding that requiring the government to procure warrants was likely to frustrate the legitimate
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618-24).
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618-21.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666-67.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622.
ld.; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667.
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government purposes in administering the tests. In Skinner the
Court held that since government activity had been adequately
circumscribed, it was unreasonable to require the railroad to
obtain warrants when such a duty would significantly hinder
the purposes of the testing program. 84 Likewise, the Von Raab
Court found that the delay and expense in seeking search warrants for routine employment matters unduly diverted the
resources of the Customs Service away from its most pressing
responsibilities of drug interdiction and maintaining the borders.85
c. Special needs outweigh individual privacy
interests. Even after finding a warrant contextually unnecessary, the Court stressed that probable cause is generally required though it is peculiarly germane to criminal investigations.86 The Court looked to a variety of factors relating to privacy interests and the special needs of the government before
concluding that the pertinent drug tests were justified.
(1) The government's interests. Mter balancing the
interests, a search may require no suspicion where the
government's special need relates to the discovery of unseen
conditions or to deter the development of such conditions 87
where the special need for the intrusion would be jeopardized
by requiring any particularized suspicion. 88 For instance, in
Von Raab the Court found that the potential drug-related
harms of impairing the judgment and integrity of Customs
Service employees' was a substantial problem outweighing the
implicated privacy interests despite any evidence of an existing
problem. 89 The Skinner Court noted that because great
human loss may result from drug or alcohol impairment before
any visible signs may emerge, testing without individualized suspicion is a compelling state interest. 90 In addition, the Court
held that particularized suspicion may be dispensed with where
it is a serious impediment to gaining valuable information
about the cause of train accidents. 91
(2) Privacy interests. While recognizing the gravity

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666-67.
!d. at 667-68.
!d. at 668.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624; see Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674-75.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
!d. at 631.
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of the individual privacy interest involved in mandatory and
suspicionless drug testing, the Court focused its attention on
factors leading to the conclusion that the government intrusion
was minimal. The Court noted government efforts to minimize
the intrusion into the employees' privacy. For example, the
urine testing was made less intrusive because neither the FRA
nor Customs Service regulations required direct visual monitoring of urination, and the testing took place in a medical
setting by independent contractors. 92 Moreover, employees
would not be required to reveal in advance any medications
they were taking and the sample could only be tested for the
presence of specified illicit drugs. 93 Further minimizing the
impact of the tests were the stringent restrictions placed on the
use of the medical information obtained through the testing. 94
In addition, the Court found that the test results were not
gathered to be used in any criminal prosecution but rather to
further a non-law enforcement goal of the government. 95
Another impetus behind the Court's finding of minimal
intrusion on privacy was the recognition that the context of the
drug testing program lessened the impact of the intrusion. 96
The Court noted that certain employees in the public sector
and in highly regulated industries have a reduced expectation
of privacy because they are subject to notice that safety, health
and fitness are important aspects of their jobs.97 In addition,
employee privacy expectations in the railroad industry are
further diminished because railway personnel have been a
primary focus of regulatory concern in the industry. 98 In Von
Raab, carrying firearms by Customs Service employees reduced
their expectations of privacy relating to inquiries into personal
fitness. 99 Moreover, employees involved in drug interdiction
should reasonably expect scrutiny into their probity and fitness.100
Ultimately the Court determined the impracticality of a
warrant or particularized suspicion by finding that the purpos-

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626-27; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 661.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 661 n.l.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627.
ld. at 628.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672.
ld

424

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 5

es behind a warrant were otherwise served and that the
government's special need in performing the pertinent searches
outweighed any intrusions on relevant privacy expectations.101 By a seven to two majority, the Skinner Court determined that the government's special need in maintaining the
safe operation of the railroads outweighed the individual privacy interests of railroad workers. 102 Similarly, the Von Raab
Court, by a five to four majority, found the government's special need in maintaining the integrity of the borders and in
ensuring public safety was more significant than the privacy
interests of job applicants. In reaching its conclusions in Skinner and Von Raab, the Court did not find any one factor to be
dispositive, 103 but rather, held the aggregate weight of interests to be in favor of the government.

3. The Dissents
The majority positions in both Skinner and Von Raab were
harshly criticized by the dissenting justices. Dissenting in Skinner, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, declared
"[t]he majority's acceptance of dragnet blood and urine testing
ensures that the first, and worst, casualty of the war on drugs
will be the precious liberties of our citizens." 104 The dissent
posited that the majority impermissibly expanded the "special
needs" exception so that it entirely excuses the probable cause
requirement in civil contexts. 105 Moreover, Marshall charged
the majority with creating a dangerous and malleable balancing test whose only justification is the policy results it per-

101.
The Supreme Court has found a special need exception under each search
object covered in the express language of the Fourth Amendment, i.e., persons,
houses, papers, and effects. See e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (persons); Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 668 (persons); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (houses) (holding that a warrantless search of probationer's home based on "reasonable
grounds" did not violate the Fourth Amendment since the state has special needs
in probation supervision); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (papers)
(holding that a warrantless search of government employee's office did not violate
Fourth Amendment because the federal government has special needs in the
employee context); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (effects) (holding
that a warrantless search of student's purse based on "reasonable suspicion" did
not violate Fourth Amendment because of special need of schools to respond
immediately to disruptive behavior).
· 102.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618-21.
103.
See Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1190 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 669 (1991).
104.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 640.
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mits. 106
Aside from Marshall and Brennan reiterating their Skinner
dissent, Von Raab drew a dissenting opinion from Justice
Scalia. For Justice Scalia, the probability of an existing problem to be addressed is a significant factor in the overall special
needs equation. While supporting the majority in the Skinner
decision, he criticized the Von Raab majority for allowing drug
testing where no record of a concrete drug problem could be
shown. 107 Scalia argued that government intrusions implicated in drug testing cannot be justified simply by their symbolic
nature, but rather, the government must show the existence of
a problem to be remedied before mandatory and suspicionless
drug testing can be sanctioned. 108

V.

PRE-ARRAIGNMENT DRUG TESTING UNDER THE
SPECIAL NEEDS ANALYSIS

After Skinner, Von Raab and their progeny/ 09
suspicionless and mandatory urine testing of arrestees constitutes a search deserving some measure of Fourth Amendment
protection. While Fourth Amendment rights are rarely shaped
through mechanical tests, 110 the Skinner and Von Raab
Courts greatly relaxed the analysis for government drug testing
programs under its "reasonableness" 111 or "balancing"
inquiry. 112 Indeed government drug testing programs are not

106.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 640-41.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680, 686-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107.
Id. at 686-87.
108.
109.
See, e.g., Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 669 (1991); Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2890 (1991); National Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d
968 (D.C. Cir. 1990); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d
1188 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990); Harmon v. Thornburgh,
878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990); National Fed'n of
Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1056 (1990); Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989).
110.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that specific content and
incident's Fourth Amendment rights are shaped by the contexts in which they are
asserted).
111.
Unreasonable searches are those infringing on privacy expectations that
"society is prepared to accept as reasonable." See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616; see also
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). The current test is primarily
objective as opposed to the Katz two part test which focused on both subjective
and objective expectations of privacy. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The circuit court opinions in Skinner and Von Raab used tests different
112.
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likely to receive any greater scrutiny than some form of rational basis review. As one commentator noted, the new standard
is based on "practicality and efficiency." 113
As a preliminary matter, some question may arise as to the
application of the Court's rationale in Skinner and Von Raab to
the somewhat different context of pre-arraignment drug testing
in the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court's use of "special needs" precedents shows that the special needs rationale
applies in varying contexts so long as the search is being implemented pursuant to a government regulatory endeavor. For
instance, in Griffin v. Wisconsin/ 14 a case involving the
government's special need to perform a warrantless search of a
probationer's home, the Court incorporated into its own analysis the rationales from such contexts as the operation of prisons, schools, government offices, and highly regulated industries.115 Consistent with Griffin, the Skinner and Von
Raab Courts relied on special needs precedents outside the employment context. 116 Consequently, the Skinner and Von
Raab rationale governs drug testing in the pre-arraignment
context.
While contextual differences between the special needs
cases exist, the contextual focus of Skinner and Von Raab
makes application of precedent relating to other government
drug testing programs a matter of comparison and contrast in
the overall balancing endeavor. Indeed, the privacy interests
implicated in pre-arraignment drug testing do not appear as

from each other as well as from the Court's present test. Von Raab used the Bell
v. Wolfish test which requires consideration of (1) the scope of the government
intrusion; (2) the manner in which it is carried out; (3) the government's justification for initiating it; and (4) the place where the search is conducted. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). The Skinner Court used another prominent test,
derived from Terry v. Ohio, requiring that (1) the government imposition be justified at its inception, and (2) the scope of the intrusion itself must be reasonably
related to the conditions which justified the initial government action. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). While these tests are still useful as analytical
organizational tools, they are much more complicated than the Court's simple
lining up of the competing interests.
113.
Lois Yurow, Comment, Alternative Challenges to Drug Testing of Government Employees: Options after Von Raab and Skinner, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 148
(1989); see also Mass, supra note 3, at 244-45.
114.
483 u.s. 868 (1987).
115.
[d. at 873-74.
116.
See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21, 630 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520 (1979) (body cavity searches of prisoners)); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868
(1987) (search of probationer's home).
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substantial as those implicated in the employment context. For
example, employees who are subjected to urine testing face possible disciplinary proceedings including discharge. However,
arrestees who participate in the drug testing program may be
released where they otherwise would not be due to judges requiring drug test monitoring during release instead of de facto
detention through imposition of unpayable financially based
release conditions. 117

A. A "Special Need" in a Non-Law Enforcement Context
Prior to balancing the "special needs" of the government
against the privacy interests of arrestees, several factors must
be established in relation to the District of Colombia testing
program. First, does the District of Columbia have a special
need in the operation of its drug testing program? Second, is
the warrant requirement redundant or unhelpful under the
circumstances? Third, does requiring a warrant or probable
cause frustrate the legitimate government purposes in performing the search?
The District of Columbia has a special need in operating
its pre-arraignment testing program because it furthers the
government's compelling interest in the regulation of its bail
system. In Salerno, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the "legitimate" regulatory function of pretrial detention and the "compelling" governmental interest in preventing criminal activity by
arrestees while on pretrial release. 118 Regulation of the bail
system and public safety are behind the purposes of pre-arraignment drug testing. 119 Without mandatory and
suspicionless drug testing, the District of Columbia would be
deprived of an effective aspect of its bailment system. While a
special need might not require a compelling state interest, the
presence of such an interest presents a special need that may
justify a warrantless and suspicionless search.
As mentioned in Skinner and Von Raab, the purpose behind the warrant requirement is to assure citizens that the
government is not acting arbitrarily. In accordance with Skinner and Von Raab, pre-arraignment drug testing may be ac-

117.
Abell, supra note 3, at 956.
118.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 749 (1987); see also Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264-65 (1984); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155
(1960).
119.
TOBERG, supra note 17, at 1.
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complished without a warrant if perceptions of arbitrariness
are avoided through procedures and circumstances which assure arrestees that the tests are lawful and narrowly tailored
in purpose and scope. Several aspects of the drug testing program serve the purposes behind the warrant requirement. For
instance, pre-arraignment testing takes place according to
detailed instructions contained in the Pretrial Services Training Manual. Before arrestees are tested, they are informed of
the test procedure, the limited use of the information in release
hearings, and that the information cannot be used against
them. Also, since all arrestees are tested, pretrial services'
workers exercise no discretion as to who is tested. Aside from
what the government has done to give notice of the search,
arrestees should be on notice that certain administrative procedures will be required of them during the course of any arrest.120
Frustration of purpose is another aspect of the special
needs analysis that will increase the likelihood that a warrant
or probable cause will not be required in arrestee drug testing.
In the District of Columbia, if an arrestee refuses to give a
sample, judges routinely order him or her to submit to a drug
test even without probable cause. However, requiring such a
judicial presentment would hinder the orderly processing of
arrestees without an appreciable benefit to individual privacy,
especially where the court will order a drug test anyway.
Probable cause is also unhelpful in determining the reasonableness of pre-arraignment drug testing. For example, a fundamental purpose in testing all arrestees is to find those individuals who show no outward signs of drug use at the time of
arrest. Moreover, the class of test subjects cannot be narrowed
by looking to a specific category of offenses because congressional and empirical findings indicate that the connection between drugs and crime is not limited to specific types of crimes
but can be related to nearly any property or violent crime. 121
To require a warrant or probable cause in the pre-arraignment
drug testing context is irrelevant because "there are virtually
120.
See United States v. Anderson, 490 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that
arrestees may be required to appear in a lineup in connection with an unrelated
offense).
121.
Brief and Appendix for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, 36,
Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In 1988 Congress
found a "well proven" connection between drugs and crime. Anti-Drug Abuse Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5251(a)(13), 102 Stat. 4309, 4309-10 (198R).
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no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate." 122
B.

Balancing the Interests

Even if a warrant is not required in the context of prearraignment drug testing, the probable cause requirement
presumptively applies though it is strongest in the context of
criminal investigations. The requirements of probable cause, or
any particularized suspicion, stands or falls as the result of the
special needs balancing inquiry where the Court "substitute[s]
its balancing of interests for that of the Framers." 123 In order
for pre-arraignment drug testing to be constitutional, the
government's interest which is the basis of the intrusion must
outweigh the individual's interest in not allowing the drug
tests.

1. Pretrial services' interest in performing the tests
Turning to the government side of the ad hoc Skinner I Von
Raab balancing test, factors relevant to the constitutionality of
arrestee drug testing can be grouped into four categories: (1)
the nature of the government's interest; (2) the "operational
realities" of the government endeavor; (3) a least restrictive
means analysis; and (4) the strength of the end-means nexus.
All of these categories support the proposition that pre-arraignment drug testing withstands Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
a. The nature of the government's interest. Under Skinner and Von Raab, a search might not require any particularized suspicion where the government's special need relates to
discovering or preventing the development of hidden conditions,
or where requiring particularized suspicion would jeopardize
the search arising from the special need.
As in Skinner and Von Raab, pretrial services is attempting to discover a drug use condition in testees which is not
readily apparent to natural observation. The District of Columbia has a compelling government interest in ensuring arrestee
reappearance at trial and in protecting the public from further
criminal activity by those on pretrial release. Since empirical
evidence supports the validity of drug use as an indicator of
pretrial misconduct, taking away its use will directly impact
the public safety.

122.
123.

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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b. The "operational realities" of information
gathering. The "operational realities" of gathering pretrial
release information fro_m the numerous arrestees passing
through the courthouse lock-up may also play a part in determining the practicality of the warrant or individualized suspicion. The Court in Von Raab noted that, in order for the government to operate its offices, common-sense dictates that
every work-related intrusion cannot become a matter of constitutional dimensions. 124 Analogizing to the operation of pretrial services and the courthouse lock-up, it would not make much
sense for pretrial services workers to test before arraignment
those arrestees suspected of drug use and to test the rest after
a judge ordered a drug screening at the arraignment.
A similar rationale was followed in Willner v.
Thornburgh 125 where the D.C. Circuit allowed mandatory
urine testing of new applicants to the Justice Department for
positions not subject to the supervision of a traditional office
environment. The Willner court considered the role of the government as an employer in that applicants are "strangers" to
their potential employer about whom the government must
make a prediction as to future behavior without the added
assurance of close post-hiring supervision. 126 Once hired a
drug user may cost the government unwarranted expense, and
once they are hired and working there may not be an opportunity for the government to supervise in any other way. 127
While pretrial services is not an employer, it has similar
needs and handicaps as the government did in Willner. At least
until arraignment, the government acts on the probability that
arrestees have voluntarily engaged in criminal activity justifying the governments limited intrusions on liberty and privacy
in order to ensure their cooperation with the judicial system.
The court requires information from these strangers in order to
make a prediction as to the arrestees' future conduct. Pretrial
services has found a measure of supervisory relief in the prearraignment and post-release testing procedures. 128
c. No less intrusive method. Another factor pushing
124.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666.
125.
928 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 669 (1991).
126.
ld. at 1193.
I d. at 1192.
127.
In Vauss v. United States, 365 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court did not
128.
allow the release of an arrestee because no adequate program existed to ensure
the arrestee's abstinence from drugs. Id. at 958.
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towards the constitutionality of pre-arraignment drug testing is
that no equally effective, but less intrusive means are available
to achieve the government's objectives. While the Court stated
that "reasonableness ... does not necessarily or invariably turn
on the existence of alternative less intrusive means," 129 such
an inquiry is another factor in the overall reasonableness assessment. 130 The Skinner Court noted that it would not "second-guess reasonable conclusions drawn ... after years of investigation and study." 131 Investigation and study on the part
of the federal government, among others, has shown that proposed lesser restrictive alternatives, such as, voluntary reporting, narrowing the class of test subjects, and the use of more
expensive confirmatory tests are not effective alternatives to
the current mandatory and uniform program.
In the experience of the District of Columbia, voluntary
reporting has been shown to be highly inaccurate. In the D.C.
program arrestees' responses as to their drug use were compared to their urine test results and it was found that less than
one-half of the arrestees testing drug-positive had admitted to
drug use during the initial interview. 132 Narrowing the class
of test subjects would essentially defeat the purpose of the tests
since the connection between drugs and crime relates not only
to drug-specific crimes, but to property and violent crimes as
well.
While some have questioned the accuracy of the EMIT
drug analysis, courts find these tests to be highly accurate and
generally accepted in the scientific community. 133 In Skinner,
the Court noted, in relation to EMIT tests, that relevant evidence need only have a tendency to make an important fact
more or less probable. 134 As used by pretrial services, the
test screens out those who use drugs so that the bail-setting
judge may require them to go through a testing or treatment
program. Moreover, all positive tests are rechecked to ensure
129.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629 n.9 (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640,
64 7 (1983)).
130.
National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 610 (D.C. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629.
131.
132.
TOBERG, supra note 17, at 5-6.
133.
Stewart, supra note 15, at 73 n.24 and accompanying text (indicating that
EMIT is 97% to 99% accurate when used with a confirmation test); see also Abell,
supra note 3, at 947 n.19; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 610 n.3; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at
672 n.2.
134.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 631-32.
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accuracy. Using other types of tests, such as the GC/MS, would
not significantly add to this process while substantially increasing the cost of testing and training required to administer the
tests. 135
d. The nexus requirement. Another factor favoring the
constitutionality of pre-arraignment drug testing is the
strength of the connection between the means used toward
achieving the goals of drug testing. The required strength of
the nexus varies from context to context depending on the
strength or weakness of other factors relating to the
government's interest. 136 In Von Raab, the connection appeared weak revealing that when a governmental interest is
otherwise strong (e.g., national security) the Court will allow
suspicionless testing in the absence of any evidence that a drug
problem exists or that the steps taken by the govemment to
address the problem will have any impact. While the
government's interest in pre-arraignment drug testing may not
be as strong as the interest in Von Raab, there is substantial
evidence to support the reasonableness of the connection between the means and goals of pre-arraignment drug testing.
In the experience of the District of Columbia program, and
in other jurisdictions, there is significant evidence of a drug
problem among the entire criminal population. Moreover, numerous studies have shown that a connection does exist between drugs and crime and between drugs and the failure to
reappear for trial. Data from the District of Columbia testing
program revealed large and statistically significant differences
in pretrial performance between those who participated in the
drug testing program and those who did not. 137 While some
may challenge the accuracy and interpretation of these studies, 138 the Court in United States v. Salerno signalled its reluctance to challenge the accuracy of social science research. 139
Judicial use and acceptance of pre-arraignment drug test135.
See supra note 60.
136.
See Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1188 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 669 (1991).
TOBERG, supra note 17, at 14; see also Douglas A. Sm;th et al., Drug Use
137.
and Pretrial Misconduct in New York City, 5 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 101
(1989); MARY A. TOBORG ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL URINE-TESTING
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: ITS USEFULNESS FOR RISK CLASSIFICATION AND AS A
"SIGNALING DEVICE" FOR RELEASE RISK (1989).
Rosen & Goldkamp, supra note 3, at 120-21.
138.
139.
See Rosen & Goldkamp, supra note 3, at 121; United States v. Salerno, 4R1
U.S. 739, 748 (1987); McCiesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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ing data in the District of Columbia further supports the reasonableness of the program. A majority of judges surveyed felt
that the pretrial drug testing program is responsible for a reduction in pretrial criminality and failures to appear. 140 In
addition, the vast majority of those judges surveyed place significant reliance on the results of pre-arraignment testing in
making release decisions. 141

2.

The arrestee's interest in not giving a urine sample.

Balanced against the government's interest in using drug
test information to make the pretrial release decisions is the
arrestee's privacy interest. As mentioned earlier, the mandatory drug testing involves two searches-the sample taking and
the subsequent analysis. In determining the weight of individual interests involved in the arrestee testing program a number
of areas require consideration: ( 1) the reasonableness of the
sample collection process; (2) the use of the test information
once it is obtained by the government; and (3) the factor's tending to diminish an otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy.
a. The reasonableness of the process. Although
downplaying the privacy interests in Skinner and Von Raab,
the Court noted that urination is "an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy" 142 and that under some
circumstances the urine collection process might be unjustifiably intrusive. 143 However, urinating in a public restroom is a
common activity where one does not expect the same degree of
privacy as in one's home. An even lesser expectation of privacy
attaches to the restroom in a courthouse lock-up where routine
security needs naturally require greater openess.
No matter how strong the government's interest is, an
otherwise justifiable search cannot be conducted in an unreasonable manner. The Court has looked favorably on government attempts to reduce the intrusiveness of the actual urine
collection process. In particular, both the Skinner and Von
Raab Courts recognized the merit of procedures which do not
call for direct observation of the urination, despite visual observation being the most desirable from a security viewpoint. 144

140.
141.
142.
14a.
144.

Judicial Perspectives, supra note 34, at 19.
!d. at 22-23.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672-73 n.2.
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(1) Direct observation. A recent lower court decision
shows that the courts are taking seriously the intrusive nature
of directly observing the act of urination. In National Treasury
Employees Union v. Yeutter/ 45 the D.C. circuit court invalidated a requirement of observation because the government
had taken other precautions to ensure sample integrity such
as, collecting excess clothing, dye in the toilet water, and listening for the sounds of urination. 146 In Von Raab, the Court observed that such precautions were adequate to ensure sample
integrity. 147 The testing program in the District of Columbia,
and all other jurisdictions, requires the direct visual observation of the urination by pretrial services workers.
While it may be unworkable in the lock-up situation to
take the kind of precautions undertaken in the employment
context, other mitigation measures may be appropriate. For
instance, in the District of Columbia drug testing procedures
for juveniles, pretrial services workers view the urination
through the reflection of a rounded mirror much like those
used to watch for shoplifters in retail stores. There is still observation under such conditions, but it is not direct and it
shows an effort to minimize the impact of the test procedure.
(2) Observation by uninvolved third parties. Another
matter of concern is the visual observation of the urination by
uninvolved third parties. 148 In the District of Columbia program, other arrestees can observe the sample collection process.
However, the process is not viewed by members of the opposite
sex. In addition, there are legitimate safety concerns for the
pretrial services workers in being isolated with arrestees.
Moreover, the presence of others helps avoid the possibility
that there will be false claims of abuse by the arrestees. Also,
in the District of Columbia, the lock-up urinals can be directly
observed by the inmates at all times, not only during the sample taking procedures.
(3) Consent. A mitigating factor in the testing procedure is that the arrestees are asked to voluntarily submit a
urine sample. While the consent process may or may not rise to

145.
918 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
146.
!d. at 976.
147.
See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 676.
Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that in148.
mates and female nurses could view the sample taking which significantly heightened the humiliating nature of the test when no legitimate need existed).
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the level of consent required that will result in a waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights, it serves to reduce the impact of the
intrusion by minimizing any "unsettling show of authority".149 The effectiveness of the consent may be questioned,
however, because of the "forced" or "coercive" nature of the
entire arrest process.
In order for consent to be an effective waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights the government must prove that such consent was "free" and "voluntary". 150 In some cases pretrial services workers may tell the arrestees that if they do not consent,
the judge will order them to take the test later, or that such a
refusal may reflect unfavorably in the pretrial release hearing.
The courts are split as to whether such threats constitute coercion.151 Ultimately, as in "special needs" analysis, the Court
uses a totality of the circumstances approach in deciding
whether consent has been validly given. 152 Individual traits
such as education, maturity, intoxication, or knowledge of the
law are relevant. Consideration of such factors must be made
according to each individual, making it difficult to assess the
overall validity of the consent made by many persons in the
mass testing procedures of Pretrial Services. 153 Nevertheless,
the consent under these conditions can be plausibly construed
as mitigating factor in the special needs balancing test.
b. Use of the drug test results. While the testing of the
urine is a search, pretrial services take steps to minimize the
intrusion. The most important factor under this section is that
the tests are used for non-criminal purposes by a neutral factfinding agency. Opponents of these drug screening programs
argue that because the information gained may be used to
impeach the arrestee at trial, there is a law enforcement purpose related to the testing program. However, such a charge is

149.
See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n.2 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 657 (1979)).
150.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247-48 (1973); see also Rosen &
Goldkamp, supra note 3, at 171-174 (concluding that some type of written informed
consent form is the surest course).
151.
See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968) (concluding that
consent is not free and voluntary when given only after the official conducting the
search asserted that he possessed a warrant); United States v. Boukater, 409 F.2d
537 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that threatening to obtain a warrant may be coercive
unless the officer (1) actually has grounds to obtain a warrant, or (2) makes Rtatement in non-threatening manner).
152.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
153.
See Rosen & Goldkamp, supra note 3, at 171-72.
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unlikely to place the program in a law enforcement category
because the Supreme Court has consistently allowed evidence
excluded for substantive purposes to be used as impeachment
evidence against a defendant. 154
Moreover, the Skinner Court approved a drug testing
scheme which arguably allowed for the release of drug test
results for law enforcement purposes rather than mere impeachment. The Court found that law enforcement was not the
testing program's "primary" purpose nor was it a "pretext"
towards that end. 155 On the other hand, the District of Columbia forbids by statute the use of information acquired by
pretrial services to be used for the guilt phase of any adversarial proceeding. Moreover, the information gathered
through drug testing is stringently controlled so that only certain non-adversarial court personel have access to it.
Additionally, the tests are designed to find only the presence of specific drugs so that other personal information which
could be discovered through drug testing is not. Most importantly, access to the information is strictly controlled by law
and agency procedure so that only those within the court who
need to know (excluding the defense and prosecutors unless the
defendant consents) the results will have access to it.
An aggravating factor under this heading is that it is necessary to ask personal medical information, such as, whether or
not the arrestee is taking medications. In Skinner and Von
Raab such questions were only asked after a positive test result. It is possible, however, that the arrestee has a reduced
expectation of privacy in the questions asked about drug use
and possible cross reactants because the information relating to
other personal matters that may bear on arrestee stability is
routinely asked. Moreover, asking questions as to medications
only after a false positive could impede operations of pretrial
services information gathering function.
c. Diminished expectations of privacy. Arrestees have a
diminished expectation of privacy because of the context of the
bail-setting process. The Skinner Court observed that certain
154.
See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (indicating that illegally
seized evidence may be used by prosecutor to impeach defendant on cross-examination). In Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35 (D.C. 1988), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, based on generally accepted reliability of EMIT results and
facts put in issue by the defendant, allowed admission of evidence relating to the
defendant's positive pretrial drug test result.
155.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5.
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employees in the public sector and in highly regulated industries have a diminished expectation of privacy, especially where
the employees have been the objects of government regulation.
While initially aimed at the workplace, the "highly regulated
industry" doctrine has been applied to such individuals as jockeys, prison inmates, and most recently to employees in the
railroad industry.
One commentator suggests that the lower court cases of
Shoemaker v. Handel 156 and McDonell v. Hunter 157 are
among the most influential cases in the area of upholding the
constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing. 158 These two
cases come from the administrative search realm of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. They are relevant because the
Skinner and Von Raab Courts favorably cited Shoemaker and
other similar cases while at the same time not limiting itself to
the requirements of the administrative search exception to the
warrant and probable cause. 159
Shoemaker dealt with the suspicionless testing of jockeys,
among others, aimed at maintaining the integrity and public
confidence in the New Jersey horse racing industry. The Shoemaker court applied the administrative search exception to the
individuals in the industry because they were essentially the
object of the pervasive regulation in the industry and they
voluntarily accepted employment in the industry. 160 McDonell
dealt with several categories of drug testing one of which was
suspicionless testing of guards having daily contact with prisoners. The McDonell court analogized the government object in
Shoemaker to the government's interest in the security of prisons arguing that prison safety was at least as important as the
goals involving the horse racing industry. 161
The Salerno Court recognized the "regulatory" nature of
pre-trial release decisions. 162 Like prisons, the process of bailsetting can be a "regulated industry". In Skinner actual notice
of drug testing in the industry to further safety interests
seemed not to be required. A mere knowledge that health and

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
Warner, supra note 3, at 188-89.
See Mass, supra note 3, at 241.
Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142.
McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1308.
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987).
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fitness were part of the job was sufficient. 163 Like employees
in the railroad industries, arrestees have been the target of
legislation which ought to apprise them of the realities of the
bailment system. Arrestees should be aware that they are required to give assurances that they will return for trial and
that they will be law abiding while on release. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy by virtue of their being held within the bailment
system.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The practice of testing for drug use in order to allow courts
to make a more informed pretrial release decision is becoming
more pervasive. With the advent of the Supreme Court's decisions in Skinner and Von Raab, it is likely that these programs
will pass constitutional muster as long as they are not arbitrary. However, the treatment of these mass drug screenings by
the courts is highly fact-specific. The use of direct visual monitoring of the arrestee's act of urination and the requirement
that arrestees reveal the use of any medications in advance of
the test result may enhance the intrusiveness of the search.
However, by carefully structuring the testing program to mitigate as much as possible any intrusions on the arrestee's privacy interest, pre-arraignment drug testing withstands Fourth
Amendment scrutiny under a special needs analysis.

Russell C. Skousen
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See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627.

